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although plaintiff's status, as a trespasser for example, may have
some bearing on the question of liability, status would not be
determinative:
[W]hatever may have been the historical justifications for the
common law distinctions, it is clear that these distinctions are
not justified in the light of our modern society .... 11
The basic theory of tort law is compensation, by one at legal fault,
to the innocent plaintiff. Regardless of whether or not Daluiso
was a wrongful possessor, he was a peaceful, innocent possessor
and now our law more fully protects that possession, not only by
statutory sanctions against forcible entry but by the availability
of a civil remedy. A man's home may not be his castle, legally,
but his peaceful possession of that home is protected by law. His
right to be free from personal injury arising from a forcible entry
is a right paramount to title.
SUSAN PARRY FINLAY
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-VICARIOUS LIABILITY
BENEFIT TEST APPLIED IN RECOGNIZING EXCEPTION TO GOING
AND COMING RULE. Smith v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board (Cal. 1968).
On December 27, 1965, social worker Charles Smith was
fatally injured in a single car accident while driving from his home
to the office. Smith's widow was denied workmen's compensation
benefits on the ground that her husband's death did not occur
while he was acting within the scope of his employment. The
California Supreme Court reviewed the order of the Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Board. Held, annulled: Because Smith
was required by his employer to bring his car to work, the going
and coming rule' did not bar him from receiving workmen's
compensation benefits. Smith v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeals Board, 69 Cal. 2d 814, 447 P.2d 365, 73 Cal. Rptr. 253
(1968).
Compaigne Generale, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31, 3 L.Ed.2d 550, 554-55, 79 S. Ct. 406, 410
(1959).
58. Id. at 117, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
I. The rule, as generally stated, is that an employee is not within the scope of his
employment while he is going to or returning from his place of work. See, e.g., I A.




In Smith, the California Supreme Court has recognized
another exception to the already much eroded going and coming
rule. The exception is not unique and has been applied by other
state courts for almost 30 years. 2 However, the reasoning the
court used in invoking this exception is a new approach to
workmen's compensation in California and may be an indication
of significant changes in the future. The purpose of this comment
will be to analyze the court's reasoning in light of past and present
applications of the going and coming rule and to discuss possible
replacement of the rule by an employment relationship test.
Workmen's compensation was established by the various
state legislatures 3 as a means of caring for the many workers who
are injured as a result of their employment.' This program has
two advantages over the state sponsored welfare programs. First,
it lets the injured employee keep his dignity instead of being
subjected to the stigma that goes with state welfare programs. The
injured industrial worker, supported by insurance benefits through
the Workmen's Compensation program is looked upon by society
much the same as the wounded war veteran. Both, injured in the
performance of their duties and by virtue of such injuries, have
earned the support they are receiving. Secondly, workmen's
compensation places the burden of caring for the injured employee
on the consumer who uses the product, the manufacture of which
caused the injury.5 By burdening this consumer rather than a non-
2. See, e.g., Pittsburg Testing Laboratories v. Kiel, 130 Ind. App. 598, 167 N.E.2d
604 (1960); Davis v. Bjorenson, 229 Iowa 7, 293 N.W. 829 (1940); Borak v. H.E.
Westerman Lumber Co., 239 Minn. 327, 58 N.W.2d 567 (1953); Bailey v. Utah State
Indus. Comm'n., 16 Utah 2d 208, 398 P.2d 545 (1965).
3. Workmen's compensation statutes were first held constitutional by the United
States Supreme Court in: New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917);
Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243 U.S. 210 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S.
219 (1917). For a history of workmen's compensation see I A. LARSON §§ 5.20-5.30.
4. A typical workmen's compensation statute includes the following features: "(a) the
basic operating principle is that an employee is automatically entitled to certain benefits
whenever he suffers a 'personal injury by accident arising-out of and in the course of
employment'; (b) negligence and fault are largely immaterial . . . ; (c) coverage is limited
to persons having the status of employee, as distinguished from independent contractor;
(d) benefits to the employee include cash wage benefits, hospital and medical expenses; in
death cases benefits for dependents are provided; arbitrary maximum and minimum limits
are ordinarily imposed; . . . and (h) the employer is required to secure his liability through
private insurance, state fund insurance in some states, or 'self-insurance'; thus the burden
of compensation liability does not remain upon the employer but passes to the consumer,
since compensation premiums will be reflected in the price of the product." I A. LARSON
§ 1.10.
5. Id. at § 2.20.
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consumer taxpayer, workmen's compensation reaches a more
equitable distribution of the burden. That is, the consumer who
actually demands and uses the product ultimately pays for the
injuries resulting from the hazards inherent in the manufacture of
that product.
Determining when an employee's injury results from his
employment is the most difficult aspect of workmen's
compensation. To assist the courts, the legislatures set up a
guideline: the injury must "arise out of and in the course of the
employment."' The courts separated the phrase into two distinct
parts: "arising out of' ' and "in the course of,"' and applied them
as two separate tests. In trying to determine when an employee
was "in the course of" his employment, the courts developed the
going and coming rule9 which said that an employee was not "in
the course of" his employment when traveling to and from work.'"
The rule was first applied in England" and was later adopted by
United States courts.1
2
As soon as the rule was formulated, the need for exceptions
became apparent. The courts found that they must not only apply
the rule, but also the exceptions. The more widely recognized
exceptions include: (1) employees enroute to and from work in
vehicles sanctioned by the employer, even though use of the
transportation was not ordered;1 3 (2) employees subject to call at
6. Workmen's compensation eligibility requirements are stated in CAl.. LABOR CODE
§ 3600 (West 1968):
Liability for the compensation . . . in lieu of any other liability whatsoever
to any person except as provided in section 3706, shall, without regard to
negligence, exist against an employer for any injury sustained by his employees
arising out of and in the course of the employment and for the death of any
employee if the injury proximately causes death ....
7. "Arising out of" refers to a causal connection between the employee, as distinct
from the general public, and a peculiar risk to which the employee was subjected because
of his employment. I A. LARSON § 6.00.
8. "In the course of" requires that the injury arise within the time and place of
employment, and while engaged in an activity whose purpose is related to the employment.
Id. at § 14.00.
9. The legislature does not mention the going and coming rule in establishing its
requirements for compensation; the rule is strictly a product of judicial decision. See CAL.
LABOR CODE § 3600 (West 1968).
10. W. WILLIS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 24 (37th ed. 1945).
II. Benson v. L. & Y.R. [1904] I K.B. 242.
12. The "going and coming" rule was initially applied in California in Ocean Ace.
& Guarantee Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 173 Cal. 313, 322, 159 P. 1041, 1044 (1916).
13. E.g.. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947); Puett v. Bahnson,
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the time of the injury; 4 (3) travelinp employees or employees on
a special errand;" (4) employees paid by their employer from the
moment they leave home until they return home;'" and (5)
employees going .home to do further work, or after beginning
work at home injured en route to the office to continue work.17
There are many more exceptions which are less widely
recognized."l
In Smith, California has recognized the exception which
pertains to an employer requiring an employee to bring his car. to
work. In so doing, the court overruled Postal Telegraph Cable Co.
v. Industrial Accident Commission'9 which involved a motorcycle
messenger who was required to furnish his own motorcycle and
was injured while riding it to work. This court held that since the
messenger could have fulfilled his employment contract by leaving
his motorcycle at work during off-duty hours, riding to or from
work was for the postal employee's convenience and any risks
encountered were those of a commuter, not an employee.
The Smith court did not address itself to the risk concept
used in Postal Telegraph but was concerned with the benefit that
accrued to an employer by an employee's activity.2° Workmen's
compensation has usually been predicated on a risk concept.2' If
an employee is subjected to a risk as a result of his employment
status, any injuries the employee suffers because of that risk are
231 N.C. 711, 58 S.E.2d 633 (1950). Nineteen states including California have recognized
this exception; none have specifically rejected it. See I A. LARSON § 16.30 n.76.
14. E.g.. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 37 Cal. App.
2d 567, 99 P.2d 1089 (1940); Souza's Case, 316 Mass. 332, 55 N.E.2d 611 (1944). I A.
LARSON § 16.12 lists other state decisions recognizing this exception.
15. E.g.. Harvey v. D. & L. Const. Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 48, 59 Cal. Rptr. 255
(1967); Olson Drilling Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 386 Ill. 402, 54 N.E.2d 452 (1944).
Eighteen states have recognized this exception; only Missouri has specifically rejected it.
See I A. LARSON § 16.10 n.44.
16. E.g.. Western Pipe & Steel Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 49 Cal. App. 2d 108,
121 P.2d 35 (1942). Eleven states recognize this exception; none reject it. See I A. LARSON
§ 16.20 n.69.
17. E.g., Proctor v. Hoage, 81 F.2d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Lang v. Board of Educ.,
70 S.D. 343, 17 N.W.2d 695 (1945). Eight states recognize this exception; nine, including
California, reject it. See I A. LARSON § 18.31 n.84.
18. Additional exceptions to the going and coming rule are in I A. LARSON §§ 16.00-
18A0.
19. I Cal. 2d 730, 37 P.2d 441 (1934).
20. Smith v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 69 Cal. 2d 814, 820, 447 P.2d 365, 369,
73 Cal. Rptr. 253, 257 (1968).
21. Liability is predicated upon "actual employer-controlled risks of employment."
See I A. LARSON § 17.30.
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compensable. In contrast, the benefit theory used in Smith is
based on the premise that: "An employer cannot request or accept
the benefit of an employee's services and concomitantly contend
that he is not performing service growing out of and incidental to
this employment.
22
Other state courts, applying only the risk concept, have
recognized the Smith exception and the California court could
have adopted this rationale. For instance, the Iowa Supreme
Court was confronted with the same situation as Smith in Davis
v. Bjorenson. A service station employee, required to have his car
present at work, was injured in an accident while driving his car
to work in the morning. The court held that this case was an
exception to the going and coming rule because the "claimant had
no selection of his mode of travel to work ' '21 and thus did not
have the option to avoid the risks inherent in travel by motor
vehicle. By being able to select a mode of travel, one has control
over the risks to which he is subjected. As an example, walking
may be less hazardous than driving a car, which is less hazardous
than riding a motorcycle. When an employer restricts the mode
of travel to work, he is in effect selecting the risks to which the
employee will be subjected. The Louisiana Appellate Court
decided a similar case on the theory of risk. In Willis v. Cloud,"6
the court pointed out the hazards of motor travel and held that
since the employee had lost his option to avoid these hazards,
injuries sustained in such travel are compensable.
2 6
However, the California Supreme Court in Smith discards
the risk theory in favor of the benefit theory without explanation.
Insight into the court's unexplained reasoning may be found by
examining the benefit theory as applied in a similar tort concept,
vicarious liability.27 Vicarious liability has a going and coming
rule which excludes an employer from liability for the torts of an
employee committed while going to or from work.28 It is based
on one of two theories: (1) The employment relationship is
22. 69 Cal. 2d at 820, 447 P.2d at 369, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
23. 229 Iowa 7, 293 N.W. 829 (1940).
24. Id. at 8, 293 N.W. at 830.
25. 151 So. 2d 379 (La. App. 1963).
26. Id.; accord. Davis v. Bjorenson, 229 Iowa 7, 293 N.W. 829 (1940).
27. Vicarious liability is defined as the liability of a master (employer) for the torts
of his servant (employee). See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 68 (3d ed. 1964).




"suspended" from the time he leaves his job to go home until he
returns to it;29 or (2) At the time of the tort, the employee was
not rendering a service to the employer."0
Many courts have tried to superimpose the tort going and
coming rule upon the workmen's compensation going and coming
rule,31 but the two are not the same.32 Compensation in a tort
action is predicated on fault,33 either that of the employer or
employee. Workmen's compensation is concerned with the proper
placement of the burden of an employee's injury, regardless of
fault, so long as support is provided and destitution is prevented.3
Fault, either by the employer or the employee, is not a
consideration. There are many circumstances which are within the
scope of employment of workmen's compensation, but not of
vicarious liability.35 Therefore, the courts should be extremely
careful in applying a tort principle to workmen's compensation
cases.
36
In tort, the determination of when an activity is within the
"course of employment," is made by applying a twofold test: (1)
Does the activity benefit the employer's enterprise and, (2) Does
29. See Harvey v. D. & L. Constr. Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 48, 51, 59 Cal. Rptr. 255,
257 (1967).
30. See Robinson v. George, 16 Cal. 2d 238, 244, 105 P.2d 914,917 (1940).
31. See. e.g.. Richards v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 19 Cal. 2d 236, 120 P.2d 650
(1941), Breland v. Taylor Engineering etc. Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 415, 126 P.2d 455 (1942).
32. 1 A. LARSON § 14.00.
33. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES. THE LAW OF TORTS 1361 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
F. HARPER & F. JAMES].
34. I A. LARSON § 1.20.
35. E.g.. Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 26 Cal. 2d 286, 158 P.2d
9 (1945).
36. S. RIESENFELD & R. MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 139 (1950):
[W]orkmen's compensation is a type of social insurance designed to protect
the workers against occupational hazards of a particular class . . . . It would
be wholly erroneous to think that the techniques used for the proper allocation
of certain industrial hazards would be correctly transposed for the distribution
of hazards of a totally different kind and involving a separate class of persons
subjected to such exposure.
Larson also comments on this problem:
Almost every major error that can be observed in the development of
compensation law, whether judicial or legislative, can be traced either to the
importation of tort ideas, or, less frequently, to the assumption that the right
to compensation resembles the right to the proceeds of a personal insurance
policy.
I A. LARSON § 1.20. But cf Shell Oil Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 199 Cal. App. 2d
426, 18 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1962), for an example of the tort concept of "foreseeability"
applied to the "special errand" exception to the going and coming rule.
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the employer have a right to control this activity? 7 The benefit
test in California is met when the employee, at the time of the
tort, was pursuing those activities which he was employed to
perform or which incidentally or indirectly contributed to the
employer's business objectives.38 It appears that this is the test
applied in Smith. By bringing his automobile to work, Smith was
performing a beneficial service for his employer. The furnishing
of the automobile by Smith enabled his employer to send Smith
into the field in furtherance of the employer's business.
The court, however, summarily dismisses the control test by
simply saying that it "raises no material issue." 39 The court
addresses itself to the physical control of the driver and concludes
that control has nothing to do with establishing an employment
relationship between employer and employee. But, the control
factor appears to be broader than this. In tort, "control really
goes to the concept of accident prevention;"4 the test relates to
an overall control of the employee. The employer has the
discretion of whether or not to subject a certain employee to a
particular hazardous situation. For instance, in Smith, the
employer exerted control to the extent that Smith had to drive his
own motor vehicle to work. The options of walking, riding a bus
or train, or riding in a car pool were closed. By reducing Smith's
modes of travel to work to just one, the employer is in effect
controlling this activity.
If the court intends to apply the benefit test in all workmen's
compensation cases involving the going and coming rule, the
decisions will be inconsistent with recognized exceptions to the
rule. These exceptions are based on a risk concept and all of them
may not be adaptable to the benefit theory. An application of the
benefit test ii! a recent case involving an exception to the rule will
illustrate this point.
In 1967, the California Supreme Court decided the case of
Zenith National Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeals Board." Zenith involved a plaintiff who suffered injuries
37. Gossett v. Simonson, 243 Ore. 16, 411 P.2d 277 (1966); see 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES at 1366-70; W. PROSSER, TORTS § 68 (3d ed. 1964).
38. Harris v. Oro-Dam Constructors, 269 Adv. Cal. App. 1027, 1031, 75 Cal.Rptr.
544, 547 (1969).
39. 69 Cal. 2d at 821,447 P.2d at 370, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
40. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES at 1368.
41. 66 Cal. 2d 944, 428 P.2d 606, 59 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1967).
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in an auto crash while en route to a remote construction site. The
plaintiff was not furnished transportation to the job site, nor
required to have his automobile present at the site. However, as
an inducement to obtain employees, because of the remoteness of
the construction site, the employer paid the plaintiff $10.00 per
day to cover transportation, food and housing expenses. The
transportation expense provision in the contract was interpreted as
the employer's implied agreement to continue the employment
relationship during the period the employee was traveling to and
from work. Since an employment relationship existed at the time
of the injury, the court held the injury compensable as an
exception to the going and coming rule.
If the benefit test as applied in Sinith were applied to Zenith,
a different holding would result. The going and coming rule
postulates that benefit from travel between work and home
primarily accrues to the employee. When the trip also produces a
benefit for the employer, such as running an errand or hauling
equipment, the Smith court held that an employment relationship
existed. Nevertheless by merely theorizing that because the
employer paid a transportation stipend an employment
relationship exists, it does not necessarily follow that a benefit to
the employer is produced. 42 The concept of an employment
relationship encompasses the benefit theory: Benefit always results
from an employment relationship, but an employment
relationship can exist without a benefit accruing. In Zenith, travel
to and from home by the employee does not benefit the employer.
The employee is providing no service to the employer and the
employer has no interest in the travel. The employee would get his
$10.00 per day whether he went home once a month, twenty times
a month, or not at all. The trip between home and the place of
work is primarily for the employee's benefit and the fixed stipend
does not alter that fact.43 Thus, application of the benefit test to
Zenith would result in denial of compensation to the employee.
The California Supreme Court is not the first court to
consider the benefit test in a workmen's compensation case.44 As
42. Harris v. Oro-Dam Constructors, 269 Adv. Cal. App. at 1033, 75 Cal. Rptr. at
548. This case involves a fact situation similar to Zenith, but is an action based on
vicarious liability.
43. Id. at 1033, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
44. The court upon awarding compensation in State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial
Comm'n, 89 Colo. 426, 3 P.2d 414 (1931) noted that the employee "was performing an
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other courts have discovered, and as can be seen from the
application of the benefit test to Zenith, the results are not always
satisfactory.45 Consequently, the court could not have intended
that the benefit test be applied to all going and coming situations;
rather, a broader test, of which the benefit test is a part, should
be used. Smith speaks of the "employment relationship"" in
discussing the different exceptions to the going and coming rule.
In finding that the employee is undergoing risks because of his
employment, or that there is a contractual relationship between
the employer and the employee, 7 or that the employee's act
benefits the employer,4 the court is really saying that an
employment relationship existed at the time the injury occurred
and, therefore, the employee's injuries are compensable. Larson,
a leading authority on workmen's compensation, states: The
"[r]ight to compensation benefits depends on one simple test: Was
there a work-connected injury?" 49 The test involves relating an
event to an employment. Thus, the employment relationship test
is the finding of a causal relationship between the employment and
the activity the employee was engaged in when injured.
The application of an employment relationship test in
workmen's compensation is not new." In an Alaska case,5' an
employee was injured while returning home from a remote job site
where the only means of transportation was by one's personal
conveyance. In awarding compensation, the court, quoting from
a previous opinion, said, "if the accidental injury or death is
act requested by his employer, for the direct benefit of his employer, and in the furtherance
of the employer's business."
45. DeSautel v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bur., 72 N.D. 35, 4 N.W.2d 581
(1942). This decision has been criticized by Larson. The benefit theory was rejected by the
court in Davis v..Newsweek Mag., 305 N.Y. 20, 110 N.E.2d 406 (1953).
46. 69 Cal. 2d at 820, 447 P.2d at 369, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 257. "The employment
relationship can hardly be severed during the performance of an act required by the
employer for his own purposes and advantage."
47. See. Zenith Nat. Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 66 Cal. 2d 944. 428
P.2d 606, 59 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1967).
48. Smith v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 69 Cal. 2d 814, 447 P.2d 365, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 253 (1968).
49. I A. LARSON § 2.10.
50. Page, Comments on Recent Important Workmen's Compensation Cases. 30
NACCA L.J. 225, 230 (1964): "The ambit of employee protection and the area of
employee responsibility should be coextensive. Employer liability and employee
responsibility should be correlative terms. If the employee's duties to his employer are
continuous, the employer's obligation to his employee must be of equal duration,"
51. State Dep't of Highways v. Johns, 422 P.2d 855 (Alas. 1967).
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connected with any of the incidents of one's employment, then the
injury or death would arise out of and be in the course of such
employment.
'52
As already.stated, workmen's compensation is designed to
shift the burden of employee injury from the injured to his
employer and eventually to the consumer. 3 The going and coming
rule limits the employer's, and in effect the consumer's, liability.
The rule was designed to facilitate deciding workmen's
compensation cases, yet it has developed so many exceptions that
the court must still analyze each case according to its facts. 4
For a number of years, scholars have recognized the need for
abolition of the going and coining rule. 5 Many courts have
commented on how burdensome it is to apply the rule.56 It places
upon the courts a rebuttable presumption that any employee
injured while en route to or from work is not to be compensated
under workmen's compensation. The employee must show that he
falls within one of the exceptions before he can receive any benefit.
Workmen's compensation is a social policy program,
tailored to need not fault, and should be treated as such." The
going and coming rule was implemented as a substitute for ad hoc
analysis and is a rule of form rather than substance. It mattered
not whether the injury was really incurred because of employment
so long as the injury occurred after working hours and off the
employer's premises. With the gradual recognition of exceptions
52. Id. at859 n.16.
53. See text accompanying note 5, supra.
54. Page, Comments on Recent Important Workmen's Compensation Cases. 25
NACCA L.J. 210, 211-12 (1960):
A slavish adherence to the rule calls for a recitation of the general proposition
that injuries suffered by an employee travelling to or from work are not
compensable; an enumeration of certain exceptions to the rule; and an attempt
to fit the fact situation at hand into one of the accepted categories.
55. One scholar declares that: "The 'going and coming' rule is not a blot upon the
liberal and beneficient bent of workmen's compensation legislation." Id. at 211.
56. The "going and coming" rule and its numerous exceptions reflect a continuing
attempt to establish a rule applicable to each of the many factual situations which appear
in the cases. This, of course, is an impossible task and the going and coming rule and the
established exceptions are by no means a comprehensive statement of the law, nor can they
be mechanically applied. It does not follow that the general rule applies ih every situation
where an established exception to the rule is inapplicable. The question is whether evidence
shows an agreement that the employment relationship continue during the journey. Joyner
v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 266 Adv. Cal. App. 498, 502, 72 Cal. Rptr. 132, 135
(1968).
57. I A. LARSON § 2.20.
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to this rule, the substantive issue of whether or not the employee
was engaged in an employfient related activity has come to the
forefront. The courts are now deciding each case in light of
existing exceptions, but they should not be bound by these. No
longer should a court be concerned with the superficialities of
form, but rather should look to the facts of each case and decide
whether or not the employee's injury was employment related.
The going and coming rule is not a legislative command; it
is a judicial fiat and the courts alone must determine whether or
not to abolish it. The California Supreme Court in Smith has
liberalized the criteria for workmen's compensation by applying
a new test to determine when a case falls within the going and
coming rule, or within one of its exceptions. But, the court needs
to go farther. Why not do away with the going and coming rule
altogether?
WILLIAM C. PATE
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